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THINKING, BIG AND SMALL
Stephen B. Burbank*
In his recent book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman ex-
plores two different modes of thinking. One of them, System One,
is automatic. It enables us to function without mental paralysis but
can lead us into error. The other, System Two, requires effort. It
enables us to resist the beguiling simplicity of many hard problems
but can yield to habits of mental sloth and, for most mortals, re-
quires selective deployment.1
Kahneman’s book makes available to the public the fruits of work
that has had a major impact on academic research. Whenever we
construct models—or encounter models constructed—on the ra-
tional actor assumption, a little bird should be reminding us of rea-
sons to doubt that assumption—doubt that may toll the thirteenth
hour.2
Reading Kahneman’s book and thinking about a tribute to Ed
Cooper that has more substance than a bouquet have caused me to
reflect on a phenomenon within the world of legal scholarship. I
would call it a cognate phenomenon, but that would dishonor the
empirical basis of Kahneman’s work by suggesting a firmer basis for
my reflections than the power of analogical reasoning. The phe-
nomenon is the view that the goal of legal scholarship is or should
be big ideas, particularly if they can claim the mantle of theory,
rather than small ideas, particularly if they can be tarred with the
feathers of doctrine. My reflections about this phenomenon and
the work and career of Ed Cooper led me to the title of this essay.
Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed that “[i]gnorance is the
best of law reformers. People are glad to discuss a question on gen-
eral principles, when they have forgotten the special knowledge
necessary for technical reasoning.”3 Law in general requires both
the capacity and special knowledge for engaging in what Holmes
* © Stephen B. Burbank 2012. David Berger Professor for the Administration of
Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2011) (“System 1 operates
automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control. System 2
allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex com-
putations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of
agency, choice, and concentration.”).
2. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–79 (1998) (arguing that rational behavior
often is influenced by bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest).
3. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 64 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963).
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528 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 46:2
called “technical reasoning.” Perhaps nowhere in the corpus juris
are these qualities more important than in the field of procedure.
Not everybody has the capacity for technical reasoning, and not
everybody has the patience to acquire the special knowledge neces-
sary to fructify it.4 Moreover, even those with both the capacity and
special knowledge may become impatient with the constraints that
knowledge can impose on legal change, particularly if the technical
reasoning that it fructifies is itself constrained by a system of prece-
dent. As a result, in an academic community that privileges the big
idea, incentives may be structured in such a way that junior faculty
members skip the special knowledge and the technical reasoning,
producing work that either avowedly liberates them from any obli-
gation of fidelity to the past or, more commonly, yields a different
way of conceptualizing the past. In the latter situation, fidelity to
the past may be either a fiction or a fortuity. Both types of project
may be pursued in search of a new theory.
I was exposed early in my academic career to “legal scholarship
in the aid of reform”5 in the work of Charles Clark, the Reporter of
the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Clark was willing to
put aside what he knew as a scholar to secure change as a
rulemaker that he regarded as progress.6 Moreover, the same re-
search project that unearthed evidence of Clark’s compromises also
persuaded me that John Ely was aware of, and chose to suppress,
aspects of the Rules Enabling Act that were inconvenient to his
scholarly project. As he acknowledged in a conversation in the early
1980s, one need not consult the preenactment legislative history of
that statute to doubt a central premise of his justly famous 1974
article, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie,7 and of the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Hanna v. Plumer,8 which he likely drafted as law clerk to
Chief Justice Warren.9 The premise is that federalism concerns
animated limitations on court rulemaking in a statute that was
drafted in the mid-1920s and enacted in 1934—four years before
4. Those who do have these qualities “could be called ‘engaged.’ They are more alert,
more intellectually active, less willing to be satisfied with superficially attractive answers, more
skeptical about their intuitions.” KAHNEMAN, supra note 1, at 46. R
5. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1186
(1982).
6. See id. at 1135–37, 1159–60 n.620 (discussing examples of Clark and other members
of the Advisory Committee ignoring or misrepresenting legislative and doctrinal history).
7. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974).
8. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
9. See Ely, supra note 7, at 693 n.* (noting that Ely served as law clerk to Chief Justice R
Warren when Hanna was decided).
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WINTER 2013] Thinking, Big and Small 529
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins10—and that authorized rulemaking in
cases governed by federal or state substantive law.11
I emerged from my first article as a law professor suffering from
disillusionment. The research for my next major project could have
turned that disillusionment into cynicism if it had not been for Ed
Cooper. As so often with Ed, the source of encouragement was the
power of his example.
In the course of research for an article on interjurisdictional pre-
clusion12 that I thought would accept and build upon insights in
another famous article from the 1970s, Ronan Degnan’s Federalized
Res Judicata,13 I came to realize that, in one way or another, Degnan
had managed to get a number of nineteenth-century Supreme
Court decisions wrong.14 Even though these errors probably were
due to mere sloppiness, they caused me to take a hard look at the
author’s treatment of aspects of the relevant history that were im-
portant to his project. Degnan’s thesis was essentially that the law of
preclusion should be and has been a reflex of the law of procedure,
with both having the same source of authority, federal or state.15
That is when I discovered that he had elided language that quite
clearly supported a contrary interpretation16 from a passage in a
critical nineteenth-century Supreme Court decision on which he
relied.17
About the time I started research on interjurisdictional preclu-
sion, Ed Cooper completed his magisterial volume on preclusion
for the treatise of which Charles Alan Wright was the lead author.18
When I read the relevant section of the treatise, it was clear that Ed
10. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
11. Compare Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465, 471, and Ely, supra note 7, at 720–21 (arguing that R
the Enabling Act’s limitations on court rulemaking were intended to protect federalism val-
ues), with Burbank, supra note 5, at 1106–12 (concluding that the Enabling Act’s limitations R
were intended to allocate lawmaking power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and
Congress).
12. Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Com-
mon Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986).
13. Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976).
14. See Burbank, supra note 12, at 742 n.32, 745, 750 n.67. R
15. See id. at 747 (summarizing Degnan’s account); Degnan, supra note 13, at 755–71. R
16. See Burbank, supra note 12, at 749 n.64 (“In both places, the quotations omit the R
language, ‘was in the exercise of jurisdiction to administer the laws of the State.’”); id. at 750
(“The Court’s opinion in Dupasseur, carefully crafted to address only the preclusive effects of
a judgment of a federal court sitting in alienage diversity, thus supports neither an attempt to
assimilate preclusion law to procedure, nor the notion that state law provided the measure of
preclusive effects for all federal judgments, prior to 1938.”).
17. See Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. 130, 135 (1875); Degnan, supra note 13, at R
745–46, 756.
18. 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (1981).
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530 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 46:2
had noticed what I noticed.19 I can imagine his dilemma. Ron
Degnan was Charlie Wright’s best friend.20 It would have been easy
simply to pass the matter by. Easy, yes—but not true to Ed’s values
as a scholar. So he navigated between friendship and integrity by
providing the information necessary for any careful reader to dis-
cover for himself what had taken place. Degnan had fudged the
historical record, reconceptualizing nineteenth-century preclusion
law in aid of something approaching a theory. Degnan had thought
big. Ed was the little bird, enabling those who were interested in the
facts to understand that the theory was, as a positive matter, a house
of cards. Ed had thought small.
We have been asked to concentrate on Ed’s work as a rulemaker.
Like the last anecdote, the rulemaking effort I have chosen to high-
light—the Style Project—evidences Ed’s capacity for thinking small.
Obviously I do not apologize for that enterprise; indeed, as readers
already may have inferred, I think that an apology is more often
appropriate for attempts to think big, at least in the field of proce-
dure. Nonetheless, I will belabor that which is obvious to anyone
who knows Ed and which is so well illustrated by the aforemen-
tioned volume of Federal Practice and Procedure: Ed Cooper is quite
capable of thinking big, but he will favor us with those thoughts
only if they pass the rigorous tests that thinking small requires.
Ed’s work on preclusion is the best single account of the law—its
history, policies, complexities, synergies, and loose ends—in the
literature. Clear, comprehensive, and analytically acute, it is for me
the model of what a great treatise should be. Together with the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments,21 it is an essential resource for
the bench and bar in a part of the legal landscape where those who
venture without a map are likely to get stuck in quicksand.
The bench and bar typically care not a whit what law professors
have to say about constitutional theory or many of the other topics
that enthrall law professors. They care what Ed Cooper and his co-
authors of Federal Practice and Procedure have to say about preclusion,
about subject matter jurisdiction, and about so much else that is the
bread and butter of procedure.22 For the bench and the bar, the
19. See id., § 4468, at 655; Burbank, supra note 12, at 750 n.65. R
20. See Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1055 n.115 (2002) (quoting letter from Wright stating that “Ron Degnan
was as close a friend as I have ever had”).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982).
22. These claims differ from claims about reliance by courts on legal scholarship as a
whole. Recent work “suggests that there has been no decline in the proportion of reported
[federal court of appeals] opinions citing legal scholarship.” David L. Schwartz & Lee Pether-
bridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1345, 1363 (2011). The same work also suggests that “[t]he higher the number
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WINTER 2013] Thinking, Big and Small 531
fact that the legal treatise may be on the cutting edge of obsoles-
cence, and that there are precious few Ed Coopers on the horizon,
should be a cause of great concern.
I believe that some current criticism of legal education is off
base. For instance, I support interdisciplinary scholarship and
teaching, just as it supports me.23 That said, one valid source of criti-
cism of legal education is the incentive structure to which I referred
earlier and the utility function it reflects. Doctrinal scholarship is
devalued in favor of that which can claim to be theory, without ade-
quate attention to the fact that the former need not be epistemi-
cally shallow24 or that, like models, theories, however elegant, may
themselves be epistemically shallow.
Too many law schools have either ruined promising scholars of
procedure by inducing them to attempt what they cannot do or
have effectively abandoned the field, recruiting scholars who write
in other areas to teach procedure as a service. Too many law
schools talk the talk of forging close ties with the bench and bar
without walking the walk, apparently hoping that alumni will spend
all their time on campus visiting legal clinics. An occasion like this
is a fine way to focus attention on the risks of such an institutional
strategy, as well as to help ensure that Ed Cooper’s example of pub-
lic service remains an attractive alternative—to applause in an echo
chamber—for scholars of procedure deciding what they want to
maximize.
Ed’s twenty years of service as Reporter matches the tenure in
that position of Charles Clark.25 When one considers that their
combined service (so far) spans forty years, it is less surprising that
there have been only seven Reporters since 1935.26 The book-
ends—Clark and Cooper—could not be more different. I have al-
ready referred to Clark’s willingness to put aside what he knew as a
scholar in the quest for what, as a rulemaker, he viewed as progress.
of opinions dealing with a constitutional law issue, the more a federal court of appeals uses
legal scholarship.” Id. at 1367. That may be, but the finding speaks not at all to the bar, to
district courts, to nonprecedential appellate decisions, or to reliance on scholarship as op-
posed to its “use” as mere window-dressing.
23. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science,
and Humility, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 41 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011).
24. But see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 88 (1995) (discussing the “epistemic
shallowness of the enterprise” of doctrinal scholarship).
25. Clark was Reporter from 1935 to 1939, see Steven S. Gensler, Ed Cooper, Rule 56, and
Charles E. Clark’s Fountain of Youth: Forever Young, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 593, 593 n.1
(2013), and again from 1942 to 1956, see Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 915 (1976).
26. They are Charles Clark, 1935–39, 1942–56; Benjamin Kaplan, 1960–66; Albert Sachs,
1966–70; Bernard Ward, 1970–78; Arthur Miller, 1978–85; Paul Carrington, 1985–92; Ed-
ward Cooper, 1992–present.
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532 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 46:2
He was also very sure of himself and, when it came to the Federal
Rules, very sure that his view of how they should be interpreted was
right. Clark, of course, thought big and, in part as a result, he and
his colleagues were flying blind over much of the landscape covered
by the original Federal Rules.27 Clark’s protectiveness was that of a
parent who knew that his child’s legitimacy depended much more
on continuing acceptability than it did on pedigree, and who
sought to secure that acceptability through the force of his person-
ality. In truth, I think he was a bit of a bully.28
Ed became Reporter when the continuing acceptability of Clark’s
child was already in serious question, as also the proper rulemaking
response. The risk that rulemakers with a different normative view
about litigation and its proper role in governance than that which
animated Charles Clark would follow his example in the opposite
direction was real. The turn to sanctions in the 1980s had been re-
vealed to have an experiential foundation just as shallow as some of
the original Federal Rules.29 Moreover, there was no reason for con-
fidence that the rulemakers would consistently seek to fill gaps in
their knowledge with evidence.
Like precedent in the common law, knowledge derived from
documented experience is the best protection against improvident
rulemaking. For twenty years, Ed has provided or encouraged the
production of that knowledge, on which he has brought to bear an
27. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases:
Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 600 (2004) (arguing
that notwithstanding the original Advisory Committee’s study of existing approaches to sum-
mary judgment, pleading, and discovery, the draftsmen “essentially [were] flying blind” re-
garding how their rules on those subjects would work in practice).
28. See Smith, supra note 25, at 951–52. In a letter to the author, the late Henry Friendly, R
who sat with Clark on the Second Circuit, observed:
I could tell you a batch of stories about Charlie Clark. He took any suggestion that one
of the rules was not 100% clear as a personal insult; he knew what was intended and
the rest of us should jolly well keep out of it. All of which, of course, resulted in our
being readier to find ambiguities than we might otherwise have been.
In the years when I knew him, Charlie was not a great scholar but a great doer; he
would arrive quickly at a sense how a case should be decided, often quite correctly,
and nothing would stand in his way. If there was a division in the panel, he would
make life miserable for the other judges until he got the majority.
Letter from Hon. Henry J. Friendly, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, to the author 1–2 (Feb. 12, 1983) (on file with author).
29. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of
Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927 (1989) (“The Advisory Committee knew little about
experience under the original Rule, knew little about the perceived problems that stimulated
the efforts leading to the two packages of Rules amendments in 1980 and 1983, knew little
about the jurisprudence of sanctions, and knew little about the benefits and costs of sanc-
tions as a case management device.”) (footnotes omitted).
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WINTER 2013] Thinking, Big and Small 533
exquisite capacity for technical reasoning. For those tempted to dis-
parage the virtues of thinking small, consider where we might be
without it. Holmes said that ignorance is “the best of law reform-
ers,” not that it is the best law reformer. Twombly30 and Iqbal 31
demonstrate the wisdom of both the observation and the
distinction.32
Ed’s tenure as Reporter has included virtually all of the Civil
Rules Committee’s protracted consideration of amendments to
Rule 23, where the damage that could be done by improvident
rulemaking rivaled that which could have been wrought by amend-
ments to the pleading rules. Mindful that other participants in this
celebration would want to discuss Ed’s contributions to our under-
standing of class actions, and because of a small personal role, I
chose another rulemaking activity that demonstrates the impor-
tance of thinking small, even if less obviously: the Style Project.
I did not need Ed’s encouragement to interest me in the Style
Project, although no one could have made the dilemmas of restyl-
ing as interesting as Ed did in his plea to “all Civil Rules constitu-
ents to engage actively in reviewing the restyled rules when they are
published for comment.”33 Who else could summon images of
Indiana Jones—discovering “wonders” in the “more obscure cor-
ners of this fascinating procedural machine”34—as an inducement
to engage in work that he elsewhere acknowledged “require[d] dili-
gent and devoted work by hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of
volunteer participants?”35
Ed’s encouragement was not necessary—indeed I did not be-
come aware of his invitation until I had already accepted it—be-
cause I was deeply skeptical that it was possible to “translate present
text into clear language that d[id] not change the meaning.”36 My
skepticism was in part a product of years of study of the history of
the Federal Rules. It also derived from my service on the National
30. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (introducing the plausibility plead-
ing requirement).
31. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (entrenching the plausibility pleading
requirement).
32. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93
JUDICATURE 109, 116 (2009) (“[A] number of the policy questions presented by Twombly and
Iqbal would have benefited from the fruits of empirical research, even if only research whose
results had already been published.”).
33. Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1761, 1762 (2004).
34. Id. at 1786.
35. Id. at 1762.
36. Id. at 1761.
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Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal.37 The Commission’s
chief of staff, who seemed frustrated that its members insisted on
actually writing the report and that they were cool to some of his
preferred policies, had persuaded the chairman to allow him to
hire an editor, ostensibly to bring unity of style to the various chap-
ters. He distributed the preliminary work product to the members
without prior notice. I was told that steam could be seen issuing
from my ears as I entered the room where the Commission was
meeting to discuss the editor’s work. Fortunately, it was not difficult
to demonstrate how, time and again, “mere editorial changes” in
fact changed meaning, often upsetting compromises not evident in
the language used in the original.
Although Ed’s encouragement was not necessary to persuade me
and Greg Joseph to undertake our own project to review the pro-
posed restyled rules—recruiting ten two-person teams, each with an
academic and a practitioner38—both the guidance he provided in
his article and his unflagging support for the enterprise were
important to the group’s final product and thus to whatever contri-
bution our work made to the restyled rules.39 However difficult it
may be for academics to surrender a healthy chunk of time in the
summer to a late-arising project with little prospect of a publica-
tion,40 how much more difficult it must be for practicing lawyers
with no prospect of a fee. For most users of the Federal Rules, in-
cluding most academics, I imagine, the task to which Ed beckoned
them had all the allure of editing a dictionary. At least, that is an
inference one might draw from the fact that the number of com-
ments submitted does not suggest “hundreds, perhaps even
thousands, of volunteer participants.”41
37. See Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline & Removal, 152 F.R.D.
265 (1993).
38. The members of the Ad Hoc Committee of Academics and Practitioners, or Restyl-
ing Project, were: from the academy, Professors Janet Alexander, Stephen Burbank, Kevin
Clermont, Edward Hartnett, Geoffrey Hazard, Arthur Miller, James Pfander, David Shapiro,
Linda Silberman, Catherine Struve, and Tobias Wolff; and from practice, Scott Atlas, Allen
Black, David Buchanan, Robert Byman, Robert Ellis, Francis Fox, William Hangley, Gregory
Joseph, Loren Kieve, and Patricia Lee Refo. See PROFESSOR STEPHEN B. BURBANK & GREGORY P.
JOSEPH, ESQ., MEMORANDUM ON RESTYLED FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE TO THE COM-
MITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, OCTOBER 24, 2005, at 7 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CV%20Comments%202005/05-
CV-022.pdf.
39. See id.
40. But see Edward A. Hartnett, Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155
(2006). Professor Hartnett was a member of our Ad Hoc Committee, see supra note 38, who R
believed that the costs of restyling would outweigh the benefits, see infra text accompanying
note 42. R
41. Cooper, supra note 33, at 1762; see also Memorandum, supra note 38 (listing com- R
ments received on restyled rules).
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WINTER 2013] Thinking, Big and Small 535
As I recall that experience, two incidents involving Ed stand out.
First, I was both surprised and impressed that Ed encouraged Greg
and me to include in our communication to the Advisory Commit-
tee a judgment about what came to be called the “big picture ques-
tion”—that is, whether the benefits of restyling outweighed the
costs.42 We had not planned to offer such a judgment, probably
because we thought the train was too far out of the station and we
were not confident that we would have an adequate basis for judg-
ment. Ever seeking to expand the Advisory Committee’s knowledge
base, and accustomed to much less diffident attitudes towards bot-
tom-line judgments, Ed has consistently refused to allow pride of
authorship to get in the way of the search for better solutions.
Second, Greg and I had the pleasure of presenting our group’s
findings and recommendations to the Advisory Committee at a ses-
sion where they were the sole order of business.43 The intellectual
interest and exhilaration of that experience derived in part from a
thirty-five page memorandum that Ed had written commenting on
our findings and recommendations,44 and in part from the discus-
sion at the Advisory Committee meeting. The learning, precision,
and common sense evident in Ed’s memorandum remind me how
lucky the Advisory Committee has been these past twenty years.
They also suggest that Greg and I were right to be diffident about
bottom-line judgments. Above all, however, I remember the excite-
ment, the sheer pleasure,45 Ed expressed about exploring some of
42. Here is the pertinent portion of Ed’s e-mail to me:
It is indeed a remarkable group that you have assembled, both from the academy and
from the bar. If the fun you all have even approaches the enormous value of your
project, you will be repaid many times over. For the Committee, this will be great
reassurance—not only for the things that are accepted without demur, but for every-
thing that is vigorously questioned. I trust that in addition to the uncounted number of
possible fine points of debate, your deliberations will include the question whether the potential
benefits of the project outweigh the potential costs. In some ways that will prove more difficult
than the rule-by-rule and word-by-word examination, but it remains an important
question.
E-mail from Edward H. Cooper, Reporter, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, to the author
(May 9, 2005) (emphasis added) (on file with author).
43. See John K Rabiej, Memorandum from John K. Rabiej to the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee (Oct. 7, 2005) (on file with author) (discussing a public hearing on November
18, 2005); e-mail from the author to Ad Hoc Committee of Academics and Practitioners
(Nov. 21, 2005) (on file with author) (reporting on a three-and-a-half-hour discussion on
November 18, 2005).
44. See Edward H. Cooper, Notes on Burbank/Joseph Report (Nov. 14, 2005) (on file
with author).
45. See, e.g., id. at 3 (“This is a neat point.”); id. at 12 (“This one is fascinating.”); id. at 13
(“This one is intriguing.”); see also Cooper, supra note 42 (“If the fun you all have even ap- R
proaches the enormous value of your project, you will be repaid many times over.”).
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the potential problems created by the proposed restyling that he
evidently had not previously recognized and the generosity with
which he treated our efforts.
It takes a person whose ego is under control to be an effective
Reporter. Durability in that role also requires that the individual
have his or her ambition under control. The sacrifices Ed has made
should not be underestimated; they are suggested by his bibliogra-
phy. He has preferred the interests of institutions, whether the
University of Michigan Law School or the federal judiciary, to his
own interests. In doing so, he has brought great credit to both insti-
tutions and helped to preserve one of them from all sorts of
trouble.
